



AND  PARTY  SYSTEM FORMATION:  A  CASE  STUDY 
OF THE  1993  LAW ON ELECTIONS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES 
OF UKRAINE 
The  purpose  of this  article  is  to  analyze  the  underlying  assumptions  about  the  relationship  of the 
electoral  laws  and  the  development  of the party  system  in  the post-Soviet  states.  The  author  generates 
a  set  of  propositions  about  the  political  consequences  of  the  double  ballot  majoritarian  electoral  system 
derived from  the  literature  on  the  subject,  and  then  analyzes  the  validity  of these  propositions  on  the 
basis  of the  empirical  evidence from  the  1994  parliamentary  elections  in  Ukraine. 
Quite  a  few  investigations  of the  political  con­
sequences  of  electoral  laws  made  an  important 
contribution  to  the  advancement of our knowledge 
about the  causal relationship between the  electoral 
model,  political party  system,  regime  stability,  and 
democracy  [1].  At  the  same  time,  many  of these 
projects have a  serious  shortcoming:  the  empirical 
material  for  them  is  drawn  primarily  from  stable 
institutionalized  democratic  regimes  with  highly 
developed party  systems. Until  fairly recently, most 
publications  on  the  subject,  which  appeared  in  the 
West,  failed  to  investigate  the  political  effects  of 
electoral  rules  and procedures  in  transitional  soci­
eties,  particularly  in post-communist nations.  The 
most  recent  work  by  Robert  Moser,  Sarah  Birch, 
Grigorii Golosov, Misa Nishikawa, Erik Herron and 
other  scholars  [2],  which  draw  on  the  empirical 
data  from  the  transitional  countries  of the  former 
Soviet Union, convincingly demonstrate that these 
nations  are  different  from  the  advanced  Western 
democracies  in  several  important  ways  making  a 
mechanical  transformation  of traditional  research 
agenda  within  the  PR  vs.  majority  debate  to  new 
political  conditions  less  useful.  Some  of these  in­
strumental  differences  are  a  lack  of well-developed 
political parties  in post-communist countries at the 
present  time  and  the  complete  absence  of a  com­
petitive party  system, which  is  a necessary attribute 
of  any  democratic  polity,  not  long  ago.  Since  a 
successful  consolidation  of  a  democratic  regime 
requires  an  autonomous  and  stable  political  party 
system,  the  critical  issue  of the  electoral  debate  in 
the  post-Soviet  countries  is  the  relationship  be­
tween  the  electoral model  and  the  development of 
a meaningful  party  system.  What  electoral  arrange­
ments  are  more  favorable  for  the  fastest,  safest, 
and  least painful  establishment  of the  institutional­
ized  party  system?  What  electoral  system  is  more 
conducive  to  the  creation  of  strong  political  par­
ties  which  would  become  an  influential  group  of 
players  in  the national political  arena  in  the  short­
est possible  time?  Cross-national  comparative  stu­
dies  of the  former  republics  of the  Soviet  Union 
using  the  most  similar  cases  design  could  provide 
insightful  answers  to  these  questions. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  analyze  the 
underlying  assumptions  about  the  relationship  of 
the  electoral  laws  and  the  development  of the  par­
ty  system  in  the  post-Soviet  states.  In  the  follow­
ing discussion I generate a set of propositions about 
the political  consequences  of the  double ballot ma­
joritarian  electoral  system  derived  from  the  gene­
ral  literature  on  the  subject,  and  then  analyze  the 
validity  of  these  propositions  on  the  basis  of  the 
empirical  evidence  from  the  1994  parliamentary 
elections in Ukraine. 
Proposition 1.  The  simple  majority  system with 
second  ballot  favors  multi-partism. 
Proposition 2.  At  the  time  of  transition  the 
majoritarian  electoral  arrangements  restrain politi­
cal institutionalization and hamper the development 
of the  political  party  system. 
Proposition 3.  In a  transitional  nation,  «the  use 
of  single-member  districts  tends  to  magnify  the 
seat  share  of  the  largest  party»  creating  de  facto 
the  dominance  of one  large  party. 
Obviously, Proposition  1  is a part of the  famous 
Duverger's  hypothesis  [3].  Propositions  2  and  3 
have been  advanced by Sarah Birch  [4]  in her study 
of the  relationship between  single member districts 
(SMD)  electoral  arrangements  and  the  party  sys­
tem in transitional countries. Besides, Proposition 2 
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found some support among other scholars [5]. 
Before we proceed to the discussion of these three 
hypotheses, it must be acknowledged that the 
empirical basis for the present analysis of the dou-
ble ballot majoritarian system is extremely limited, 
N = 1. Since Ukraine was the only post-Soviet 
nation that conducted al least one cycle of reason-
ably free and fair parliamentary elections under an 
entirely double-ballot majoritarian model, my analy-
sis of the relationship between this type of elec-
toral formula and the party system is based exclu-
sively on the Ukrainian case. The 1990 elections 
to the republican Supreme Soviets in the former 
Soviet republics cannot be considered truly com-
petitive multi-party contests. Therefore, the 1994 
elections to the Rada serve as a sole testing ground 
for the three propositions. I believe that the present 
discussion is important for better understanding of 
the genetic and early development stages of the 
Ukrainian party system. However, it would be a 
mistake to generalize about the double ballot SMD 
model based on a single and rather atypical case 
of first post-authoritarian elections in the condi-
tions of a high level of uncertainty. 
Before we proceed to a discussion of political 
implications of the double ballot electoral model in 
Ukraine, a brief overview of this voting formula is 
necessary. For its founding elections held in 1994, 
Ukraine retained an obsolete Soviet-type electoral 
system. On 10 November 1993, the «Communist 
Zoo», as Seghiy Holovaty called the Ukrainian Su-
preme Soviet formed in 1990 [6], adopted the Law 
on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine. Four 
hundred fifty deputies were elected in single-mem-
ber constituencies according to the absolute ma-
jority runoff formula. In order for elections to be 
valid in any given constituency, the electoral law 
imposed two tough hurdles: 50 % plus one of the 
eligible electorate had to vote, and 50 % plus one 
vote was required for eventual victory. 
The 1993 electoral law that regulated the found-
ing elections in Ukraine was called «Byzantine» and 
«archaic». I agree with these epithets. Indeed, more 
than 50 years ago Maurice Duverger wrote that the 
simple majority double ballot system «is in fact an 
old method which is little used nowadays» [7]. 
Most of the democratic nations that employed this 
voting model at some point in the past abandoned 
it at the beginning of the 20th century. At the turn 
of the 21sl century, this system is abundant only in 
the world of authoritarian states including post-
Soviet nations that established non-democratic re-
gimes. 
Another distinguishing characteristic of the 
electoral system used for the 1994 elections to the 
Rada was its distinctly anti-party nature. The 
Ukrainian electoral engineers designed an electoral 
law that was conspicuously biased against politi-
cal parties. This law created favorable conditions 
for the nomination and registration of independent 
candidates and representatives of the informal «par-
ty of power», on the one hand, and weakened the 
electoral function of political organizations and 
restrained the development of the national party 
system, on the other hand. 
For example, under the 1993 election law 
a candidate could be nominated by one of the fol-
lowing three groups: an undefined «workers' col-
lective», informal «group of voters», and a regis-
tered regional branch of a political party. To nomi-
nate a candidate by a political party was strikingly 
more complicated than by a group of co-workers 
or independent electors. Article 23 that regulated 
the nominating procedure stated «In order for vo-
ters to nominate a candidate for deputy, no less than 
10 voters of a given electoral constituency who re-
side within the boundaries of an electoral consti-
tuency in which the candidate is nominated, must 
sign an application. In order for the labor collec-
tive to nominate a candidate for deputy an applica-
tion on behalf of the collective must be signed by 
a person authorized for that by a meeting or con-
ference, which nominates a candidate. In order for 
a meeting (conference) of a regional branch of the 
party to be valid, no less than two-thirds of the 
party membership of the regional branch of the 
party or delegates, elected to participate in a con-
ference and which belong to the appropriate re-
gional branch if it has no less than 100 members 
of the party, must participate in the meeting. The 
conference must have no less than 50 delegates. 
A party nominating a candidate for deputy shall en-
close with the application: (1) an extract from the 
minutes of the meeting (conference) of the regional 
party branch; (2) a list of 100 party members 
which belong to the appropriate regional branch» 
[8]. The U.S. Commission on Security and Co-
operation in Europe pointed out that Ukrainian par-
ties had to submit 30 different items of informa-
tion dealing with the nomination of candidates to 
the Verkhovna Rada, while groups of voters and 
labor collectives only required eight and one doc-
ument respectively [9]. A much simpler procedure 
for the nomination of a candidate by a group of 10 
voters or unspecified number of co-workers forced 
many members of political parties to choose one 
of these methods of entering into the electoral race. 
Although contestants named by labor collectives or 
groups of voters could choose to indicate their 




ticket.  This had  an  effect  of confusing many  elec­




ian  electoral  engineers  for the  1994 elections,  the 
majoritarian  system  in  a  transitional  nation with 
an underdeveloped party  system creates  inevitably 
both mechanisms of hindering political institution­
alization  and  a  favorable  environment  for  non-af­
filiated  candidates  to  compete  for  seats  in  the na­
tional  assembly.  Sarah  Birch  gives  a  good  expla­
nation  of this  phenomenon:  «because  they  focus 
on  electoral  strategy  in  relatively  small  districts, 
single-member  systems  encourage  candidacies  by 
small groups of political entrepreneurs; candidates 
only  have  to  organize  in  one  district  to  have  a 
chance  of representation.  This basic  fact provides 
a  strong  incentive  for  independents  to  run»  [11]. 
Robert Moser seconds this claim:  «single-member 
districts allow individual candidates with name rec­
ognition  and  financial  resources  to  find  success 
regardless  of party affiliation»  [12].  The outcomes 
of the  1994  electoral  contest to  the Ukrainian  le­
gislature provide a strong empirical support for this 




of independents  -  86.4  %. 
As  can  be  seen,  the  results  of the majoritarian 
elections to the Ukrainian national legislature lend 
their full support for Proposition 2. However, Prop­




parties are  «often under-institutionalized  ...  poor­
ly  organized,  poorly  resourced,  inexperienced  in 
mass  mobilization  and  have  weak  links  with  dis­
tinct  sectors of mass  electorate.  Under  these  cir­
cumstances, the authoritarian successor party may 
well be  the  only electoral  contender  in a position 
to  benefit  from  the  'large  party  effect'  character­
istic  of single-member  systems,  even  if its  overall 
level  of support  is modest»  [13].  Although  this  is 
an accurate description of the early post-independ­
ence political  reality  in Ukraine,  the  threat of the 





were  held  in  reasonably  free  and  fair  conditions. 














Ukrainian  electoral  statistics  is  drastically  dif­
ferent  from  comparable  aggregate  data  of other 
nations  that  employed  the  SMD  systems  in  their 
first  transitional election. The mean proportion of 
votes  and  seats  won  by  the  largest  party  in  such 
nations  constitutes  43.38  %  and  56.2  %  corres­
pondingly  [15].  Another  important  indicator  of 
a relative significance of the largest party is a dif­
ference  between  its  proportion  of  votes  and/or 
seats  and the proportion of votes/seats won by  the 
second largest party. Again, results of the 1994 elec­
tions  to  the Rada  (7.57 %  and  19.4  8%)  stand  in 
drastic  opposition to  other countries  (mean value 
14.04 %  and 36.67 %)  [16].  Other  former repub­
lics of the Soviet Union also demonstrated consid­
erably greater values  of the gap between two  lead­
ing contestants  than  their  Southern  Slavic  neigh­
bor:  17.41  % and 31.54 %  for the mixed electoral 
model countries and  16.21  % and  18.94 %  for the 
PR nations. 
The outcomes of the Ukrainian elections should 
not be  interpreted  in a way that the  SMD  system 
in this nation has not produced a tendency to cre­
ate  an  over-large  majority  of the  largest  political 
party  in  the  national  legislature.  The  last  row  in 
Table  1  shows that such a trend did exist. The ra­
tio  of seat  shares  to  vote  shares  in Ukraine's  first 
transitional  election had a very high value  of 2.00 
in comparison to the means of both the post-Sovi­
et  nations  (1.22  for  PR  and  1.32  for  mixed  sys­
tems)  and  other world's  countries with majoritar­
ian  models  (1.37)  [17].  However,  the  tendency 
toward  one-party  dominance  in Ukraine was  se­
verely  suppressed  by  the  overall  anti-party  char­
acter  of the  1993  Law  on  Elections  of People's 
Deputies of Ukraine. 
Many  studies  of majoritarian  systems  empha­
size that this electoral formula is conducive to «lo­
calism  and  constituency-centered  politics»  [18]. 
William  Irvine  found  that  «a  seriously  discrepant 
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Table 1. Mean seat and vote shares in the legislature after the first post-independence elections1 
Outcomes of first 
post-Soviet elections 
Mean proportion of seats won by the 
largest party 
Mean difference between the proportion 
of seats won by the largest party and the 
proportion won by the second-largest 
party 
Mean proportion of votes won by the 
largest party 
Mean difference between the proportion 
of votes won by the largest party and the 
proportion won by the second-largest 
party 
Mean ratio of seat shares to vote shares 






















Source: Birch S. Single-member District Electoral Systems and Democratic Transition II Electoral Studies.-
No. 3 , - Appendix A. All available post-Soviet nations are included. 
2005. 
distribution of seats relative to the distribution of 
votes may give rise to regionalism as different 
blocks of voters come to feel that they are unable 
to have their views expressed in the national par-
liament» [19]. Giovanni Sartori also describes this 
troubling for efficient governing effect of the SMD 
system and argues that a well-institutionalized na-
tion-wide party system serves as one of the most 
effective barriers to «centrifugal and localistic 
pulls» of the majoritarian model [20]. Somewhere 
else [21], I demonstrate that the geographical ho-
mogeneity of party electoral strength is different 
in the democratizing countries and stable democratic 
nations with the developed system of political par-
ties. Most transitional countries feature «underde-
veloped and/or incompletely nationalized» party 
systems that can hardly resist centrifugal tenden-
cies of SMDs. To complete this vicious circle, an 
electoral system that does not encourage national-
ization is likely to magnify party system heteroge-
neity [22]. The situation was particularly grave in 
Ukraine in 1994. No doubt that along with histor-
ical and cultural cleavages in Ukrainian society, the 
single member constituency voting model has great-
ly contributed to the highest variability coefficient 
of the party system demonstrated in Ukraine in the 
first post-independence elections in comparison to 
all other electoral contests in all five nations under 
analysis [23]. 
The 1993 Law on Elections of People's Depu-
ties of Ukraine that regulated the first post-inde-
pendence elections to the Rada continued the tra-
ditional Soviet majority-based system with two 
ballots. It created favorable conditions for the nom-
ination and registration of independent candidates 
and representatives of the so-called «party of pow-
er», on the one hand, and weakened the electoral 
function of political organizations and restrained the 
development of the national party system, on the 
other hand. A combination of subjective anti-par-
ty elements in this electoral bill and a 'natural' anti-
party bias inherent in the SMD system failed to 
facilitate the political integration of the Ukrainian 
society and stimulate the development of the na-
tionalized party system. The Ukrainian version of 
the majoritarian model diminished the value of party 
identification and produced the amorphous legis-
lature with a large number of deputies who were 
not affiliated with political parties. Such members 
of parliament were not bound by party discipline 
and often strived to please narrow interests of their 
constituencies or their own personal ambitions. 
The non-party status of many deputies who either 
never joined any parliamentary faction or often 
changed their faction affiliation made the legisla-
tive policy-making process more difficult and ham-
pered electoral identifiability and accountability of 
parliamentary factions and political parties in gen-
eral. The majoritarian electoral arrangements em-
ployed for the founding elections in Ukraine did not 
contribute to the strengthening of the party sys-
tem in this country. The anti-party nature of the 
' Table 1 is based on Birch S. Single-member District Electoral Systems and Democratic Transition II Electoral Studies,-
2005.- No. 3.- Table 2, P. 289. See this source for detailed explanation of methodology. 
2
 Ukraine, 1994. 
3
 Armenia I, 1995; Armenia II, 1999; Lithuania, 1992; Russian Federation, 1993. 
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НА  ФОРМУВАННЯ ПАРТІЙНОЇ  СИСТЕМИ НА ПРИКЛАДІ  ЗАКОНУ 
ПРО ВИБОРИ НАРОДНИХ ДЕПУТАТІВ УКРАЇНИ ВІД  1993 р. 
Метою  даної статті  є аналіз відношень між виборчими законами та розвитком  систем 
політичних  партій  в  пострадянських  державах.  Автор  висуває  низку  гіпотез  про  політичні 
наслідки мажоритарної виборчої системи подвійного голосування та аналізує обґрунтованість 
цих пропозицій, базуючись на емпіричному матеріалі парламентських виборів в Україні 1994 року. 
